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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
RICHARD KAY and
MYRTLE L. KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12300

Brief of Respondent Myrtle L. Kay

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a case where Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief declaring that its liability policy issued to Myrtle L.
Kay does not cover her in a lawsuit filed against her by
1

her son, Richard Kay, for injuries and damages resulting from an automobile accident on August 4, 1968.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment ruling that Plaintiff is estopped
from asserting noncoverage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Myrtle L. Kay, seeks to have the Summary Judgment in her favor affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants were involved in a one car roll-over accident on August 4, 1968. Myrtle L. Kay was the owner
and operator of the automobile in which Richard Kay
was a passenger. Richard Kay filed a lawsuit against
Myrtle L. Kay on July 15, 1969, alleging that negligence on her part caused injuries, damage and loss to
him. Myrtle Kay is the mother of Richard Kay, who was
35 years of age, and they lived together in the home of
Myrtle L. Kay.
Prior to the time that the lawsuit was filed, Richard
Kay had employed Heber Grant Ivins to represent him
and Ivins had written a letter to Myrtle L. Kay in his
behalf. This letter was turned over to Plaintiff, and, on
May 1, 1969, Plaintiff's Field Claims Representative in
2

the Provo area, Vern M. Bowcutt, responded with a
letter to Ivins. In this letter, Bowcutt stated in part as
follows: ( R. 22)
"We do. have an exclusion in our policy that in
essence is as follows: 'This insurance does not
apply under coverage A bodily injury to any insured or any member of the family of an insured
residing in the same household as the insured.'"
The action was filed on July 15, 1969, two and onehalf months following the above letter.
Also, following the accident, Plaintiff processed the
claims of both Defendants for medical benefits provided
by the same insurance policy. (Myrtle L. Kay
tion p. 21)
After receipt of service of summons and complaint,
_Myrtle Kay delivered these to the field representative
for Plaintiff and was thereafter represented in the lawsuit by Plaintiff's attorney. (R. 18) Myrtle Kay cooperated with Plaintiff and furnished Plaintiff's representative with a statement. (Myrtle Kay deposition p. 24,
35) Plaintiff's counsel thereafter filed an Answer, obtained hospital records concerning the injuries to Richard Kay, and took the deposition of Richard Kay for
preparation for trial. (R. 18) Plaintiff undertook the
defense of the aforesaid lawsuit unconditionally and
without a reservation of right.
By order of the Fourth Judicial District Court on
October 9, 1969, the trial of said case was set for J anuary 12, 1970. On October 23, 1969, while still represent3

ing Myrtle Kay, and with no prior notice of any kind,
Plaintiff's attorney filed this action for declaratory relief seeking judgment declaring that the family exclusion
provision worked a denial of coverage to Myrtle Kay.
On March 25, 1970, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal as counsel for Myrtle L. Kay in the
personal injury action.
Both sides filed Motions for Summary Judgment
supported by Affidavits, depositions and the record, together with a stipulation requested by counsel for Plaintiff. It appearing to the Trial Court that Myrtle Kay's
interests were prejudiced as a matter of law by Plaintiff's undertaking of her defense without a reservation
of right, the Court granted the motions of Defendants
and denied Plaintiff's motion. ( R. 79)
ARGUMENT
POINT I. STATE FARM WAIVED AND IS
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ITS POLICY
DEFENSE.
A. THE BETTER AUTHORITY HOLDS
AN IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
PREJUDICE.
The great weight of authority in this country, and
we submit, the better reasoned authority,holds that when
a liability insurer with knowledge of a ground of forfeiture or noncoverage under a policy, assumes and conducts the defense of an action brought against the insured
4

without disclaiming liability and giving notice of a reservation of rights, it is thereafter precluded from setting
up the grounds of forfeiture or noncoverage. This authority holds that there is an irrebuttable presumption of
prejudice to the insured in such a situation. This authority is amply demonstrated in two A.L.R. Annotations
and the A.L.R. Later Case Service. See 81 A.L.R., p.
1326 to 1402, at p. 1358, and 38 A.L.R.2d, p. 1148 to
1180, at p. 1160. See also Later Case Service for 32 to
39 A.L.R.2d, at p. 736. The weight of authority supports the statement at 44 Am.J ur.2d, par. 1553, at p.
436, as follows:
"Although there is some authority to the contrary, the general rule supported by the great
preponderance of authority is that if a liability
insurer, with knowledge of a ground of forfeiture
or noncoverage under the policy, assumes and
conducts the defense of an action brought against
the insured, without disclaiming liability and giving notice of its reservation of rights, it is thereafter precluded in an action upon the policy from
setting up such ground of forfeiture or noncoverage. In other words, the insurer's unconditional
defense of an action brought against its insured
constitutes a waiver of the terms of the policy and
an estoppel of the insurer to assert such grounds."
Some representative decisions are as follows: Royle
Min Co. v.
C Co., (1907) 126 Mo.App. 104,
103 S."\V. 1098 and the same case on a later appeal,
( 1912) at 161 Mo. App. 185, 142 S.W. 438; Tozer v.
Ocean Acci. and Guarantee Corp., (1906) 99 Minn. 290,
109 N.,V. 410; Malley v. American Indemnity Corp.,
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(1929) 297 Pa. 216, 146 A. 571; Globe Nav. Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., (1905) 39 Wash. 299, 81 P.
826; Claverie v. American CllSualty Co. (4th Cir.),
(1935) 76 F.2d 570, cert. den. 296 U.S. 590, 80 L.Ed.
417, 56 S.Ct. 102; American Casualty Co. v. Shely,
(1950) 314 Ky. 80, 234 S.W.2d 303; Ziegler v. Ryan,
(1939) 66 S.D. 491, 285 N.W. 875; Beatty v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., (1933) 106 Vt. 25, 168
A. 919; New Jersey Fidelity Plate Glass Ins. Co. v.
McGillis, (10th Cir.), (1930) 42 F.2d 789, Schmidt v.
National
Casualty Ins. Co. (8th Cir.), (1953)
207 F.2d 301; General Tire Co. of Minneapolis v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co. (8th Cir.), (1933) 65 F.2d
Casualty Co.
237; Pendleton v. Pan American Fire
(10th Cir.), (1963) 317 F.2d 96; Harbin v. Assurance
Co. of America (10th Cir.), (1962) 308 F.2d 748;

Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil
(10th Cir.), (1942) 129 F.2d 621.

Gas Co.

The annotation at 38 A.L.R.2d, p. 1148, shows that
later cases in increasing and overwhelming numbers have
supported the majority rule. This, together with the
statement in the A.L.R.2d Later Case Service, show that
the rule has been supported in the following jurisdictions: Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, 2nd
Cir., 4th Cir., 8th Cir., 9th Cir., and 10th Cir.

6

An illustrative decision containing a clear statement
of the reasons for the rule is Pendleton v. Pan American Fire Casualty Co. (10th Cir.), supra. This case
came from the District Court of New Mexico and was
argued before Murrah, Breitenstein and Hill. The
Court states at p. 99:
"At the outset, we think this case is controlled by
the long established rule that a liability insurance
carrier, which assumes and conducts the defense
of an action brought against its insured with
knowledge of a ground of forfeiture or noncoverage under the policy, and without disclaiming liability or giving notice of a reservation of its right
to deny coverage, is thereafter precluded in an
action upon the policy from setting up the ground
of forfeiture or noncoverage as a defense. In other
words, the insurer's unconditional defense of an
action brought against its insured constitutes a
waiver of the terms of the policy and an estoppel
of the
,, insurer to assert the defense of noncoverage.
The Court also ref erred to a statement of Judge
Breitenstein from the case of Harbin v. Assurance Company of America, supra, as follows:

"* * * In such circumstances the control of the
defense by the insurer carries with it the potential
assu1:11ption
of prejudice to the insureds and
of such control without a reservation of right to
deny liability would have obligated the
to
pay within the policy limits if the plaintiff should
»
succee d.
And dealing with the presumption of prejudice at p. 99,
the Court states:
7

"Indeed, by the weight of authority, it is not necessary for the insured to show prejudice in such a
situation because he is presumed to have been
prejudiced by virtue of the insurer's assumption
of the defense."
The case also quotes Judge
speaking for the
Court in
General Ins. Co. v. Rudco
Gas
Co., supra, at p. 627:

"* * * The right to control the litigation in all of
its aspects carries with it the correlative duty to
exercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, honest
and conscientious fidelity to the common interest
of the parties. * * * When the insurer undertakes
the defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the
agent of its assured in virtue of the contract of insurance between the parties, and when a conflict
of interest arises between the insurer, as agent,
and assured, as principal, the insurer's conduct
will be sub}ect to closer scrutiny than that of the
ordinary agent, because of his adverse interest.

* * *"

-

Undoubtedly, the reason behind the majority rule
stems from the strong public policy opposing attorneys
representing conflicting interests. In most instances, the
attorney for the insurance company defending an individual insured, finds that both have similar interests.
However, occasionally, situations arise where the interests of the insurance company conflict with the interests of the individual insured. A common example of
this arises where the Plaintiff will offer to settle the
case within policy limits. In this type of situation, the
interest of the insured is in having the case settled with-
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out posing any kind of threat to his own security. In
numerous instances insurance companies have refused
to settle within the limits only to have a later verdict
come in for more than the limits of the policy. Many of
these cases have imposed liability on the insurance company for taking a bad faith gamble with the security of
its insured.
The general rule dealing with conflicts of interest
is stated at 7 Am.J ur.2d, Attorneys at Law, par. 154, at
p. 139:
"An attorney owes to his client an undivided allegiance, and after he has been retained by, and received the confidence of, a client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client,
given after full knowledge of all the facts and
circumstances, act both for his client and for one
whose interest is adverse to or conflicting with
that of his client in the same general matter. It
makes no difference how slight the adverse interest may be. And the fact that the motive and
intention of the attorney are honest is immaterial.
"An attorney cannot accept employment from
others in matters so closely related to those of his
client as to be in effect a part thereof."
In this case, the insurance company, on undertaking
the defense and completely controlling it, owes the insured the duty of immediate revelation of any conflicting interest between her and the company.
The insurance company had knowledge, prior to
the lawsuit, of the exclusion in the policy dealing with
members of a family living in the same household. Plain-

9

tiff's agent in the Provo area had this knowledge and
communicated it. Accordingly, when the insurance company chose to unconditionally undertake the defense of
its insured in the automobile accident lawsuit, it waived
the conflicting interest between it and its insured as to the
policy defense.
It is only right and just that it should be held to
this waiver and forced to finish the defense and to pay
according to the terms of the policy in the event of recovery.
One of the points stressed by the insurance company
in its brief, is that the company acted promptly after receiving knowledge of the facts concerning the policy exclusion. In no place in Plaintiff's brief was any mention
made of the letter from Vern Bowcutt, its Field Representative, to Heber Grant Ivins. It does not lie in the
mouth of the insurance company to argue that it acted
promptly after receiving knowledge when it is undisputed that its agent had this knowledge more than two
and one-half months prior to the filing of the case. The
know ledge of the agent received in the course of his employment becomes the knowledge of the insurance company. See Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. of
Portsmouth, et al., (1951) 120 U. 109, 232 P.2d 754. In
addition to this specific knowledge communicated by the
agent, the insurance company paid off the medical claims
of Richard Kay and Myrtle L. Kay pursuant to the
terms of the policy.
It seems clear that good public policy would de-
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mand a ruling in line with the ruling by the Trial Court
that prejudice to the insured by the unconditional assumption and control of his defense is an irrebuttable
presumption. Certainly, it seems inappropriate, as has
been held by a minority view, to give such a question to a
jury of lay people, unacquainted with the strong public
policy against an attorney representing conflicting interests.
As was stated by Myrtle L. Kay in her Answers to
Interrogatories (R. 68):
"***Had Myrtle Kay known that Lawrence L.
Summerhays sought to represent her interests and
at the same time conflicting interests held by her
insurance company, she would have insisted on
having her own counsel from the beginning. Furthermore, she would not have given the statements to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. She has lost by Mr. Summerhays' appearance as her attorney, really on behalf of State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co., the right to control
and manage her own case. She has also lost the
right to individualized attention by counsel of her
own choosing and any opportunity to settle or
compromise the claim, and the personalized faith
a client has in his own lawyer. She was induced
by the action of State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co. and its attorney, Lawrence L. Summerhays,
to refrain from using such means or taking such
action as lay in her power from the time of the
accident until the matter was set for trial."
As a matter of fact, counsel for Plaintiff represented the Plaintiff in the personal injury case following the
filing on July 15, 1969 right up until his withdrawal on
11

March 25, 1970. During this same period of time, he also
represented the insurance company against Myrtle Kay
in this lawsuit from its filing on October 23, 1969.
It is easy to understand why the strong public policy
against representation of conflicting interests demands
the irrebuttable presumption of prejudice to Myrtle L.
Kay from the unconditional assumption and control of
her defense in the personal injury lawsuit.
B. THE DOCTRINE AGAINST BROADENING COVERAGE BY WAIVER AND
ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE.
The cases supporting the majority rule above, make
no distinction as to what the basis for noncoverage or
exclusion is and deal with various exclusions and defenses in liability policies.
Plaintiff argues a general broad rule that waiver
and estoppel cannot be used to enlarge coverage. This
doctrine is covered in an annotation at 1 A.L.R.3d, p.
1139-p. 1183. It is stated at the outset at p. 1143:
"Waiver and estoppel arising from the company's
assumption of or continuation in the defense of
an action brought against the insured has be.en
separately
treated and is therefore not dealt with
,,
here.
Footnote 6 on the same page explains:

"It is pointed out in the foregoing annotation (38
A.L.R.2d, 1148) that the courts are generally
agreed that defenses, including that of noncover-
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age,.are
by the insurer's assumption of or
contmuabon m the defense of an action against
the insured. This is, of course, contrary to the
holdmgs in the bulk of the cases collected here
***,and while few, if any, courts have seen fit to
make an express distinction between the one situation and the other, it is evident that such a distinction does exist. The reader is there/ore cautioned that the cases here collected should not be
regarded as authority where the conduct relied
upon as constituting the alleged waiver or estoppel arises in connection with the defense of an action against the insured."
Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument is inappropriate
where waiver and estoppel arise from the unconditional
assumption and control of the defense of a lawsuit as in
this case. The case of State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
v. Cooper, (4th Cir.) 233 F.2d 500, cited by Plaintiff in
its brief, is, therefore, not in point for the reason that the
waiver asserted in that case consisted of the company's
agent leading the insured to believe that the policy would
cover injuries to his wife when in truth and in fact it did
not.
Plaintiff's argument and authorities against broadening coverage by waiver are obviously inappropriate
and not in point. We urge the Court to follow the great
weight of authority as shown in the A.L.R. Annotations
which we have cited as distinguished from the cases cited
in the annotation at 1 A.L.R.3d, p. 1139.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, we assert that the great weight of au.
thority in this country and, we submit, the better rea.
soned authority based on sound and good public policy.
support the position of the Defendant, Myrtle L. Kay.
The Plaintiff assumed the defense of the personal injury
lawsuit brought by Richard Kay against Myrtle L. Kay
with full knowledge of the family exclusion. The Plaintiff failed to reserve its rights or notify Myrtle L. Kay
of the conflict in interest which arose between it and her.
The insurance company remained in full control of
Myrtle L. Kay's defense to and following the time it
filed this action against her.
We submit that an irrebuttable presumption has
arisen, based on these facts and sound public policy, that
Myrtle L. Kay has been prejudiced by this conduct on
the part of the insurance company. Accordingly, the insurance company has waived the policy defense and is
estopped from raising it.
We submit that the summary judgment granted by
the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK of
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
Myrtle L. Kay
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